McChrystal...
Kilcullen's
recent book, The
Accidental Guerrilla,
presents the case for a Long
War of fifty or even 100 years' duration,
with chapters on Iraq (a mistake he believes was
salvaged by the military surge he promoted in 2007-08),
Afghanistan (where he recommends at least a five-to-ten
year campaign), Pakistan (whose tribal areas he sees
as the center of the terrorist threat) and even
Europe (where, he says, human rights laws
create legislative "safe havens"
for urban Muslim
undergrounds).
...Civilian
casualties strewn
across these battlefields have
been obscured by the fog of war, but
hundreds of thousands of people, mainly civilians,
could ultimately die in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, each of them leaving
a legacy of vengeful
violence.
projections reveal
a staggering audacity--not Obama's
audacity of hope but an audacity of martial
commitment. A fifty- to 100-year military campaign--
the subtitle of Kilcullen's book is Fighting Small Wars in
the Midst of a Big One--will span thirteen presidential
terms and twenty-five Congressional sessions,
casting a long shadow over generations
of politicians not yet
running for
office...
audacity
becomes ever more
dangerous without checks and
balances. Without his acknowledging it,
Kilcullen's plan plays directly into what he believes
is Al Qaeda's strategy of exhausting the United
States militarily and economically.
And yet he thinks the
Long War is
inevitable.
world
counterterrorism
community that is planning
the Long War, Kilcullen
has said, is "small
and tightly
of course,
these accidental guerrillas
are no accident at all. They inevitably
and predictably emerge as a nationalist force
against foreign invaders. Their resistance to imperialism
stretches back far before Al Qaeda. In fact, Al Qaeda was
born with US resources, as a byproduct of resistance
to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and
earlier oppression of hundreds
of Islamic radicals
in Egyptian
to the model also
forces Kilcullen and other
counterinsurgency devotees to downplay
the secretive and violent underside of their approach.
The cult of clandestinity is symbolized by General
McChrystal, whose entire career in
Iraq remains a classified
secret.
What
we do know
about McChrystal comes
from the leading mainstream
narrator of the Iraq War, Bob Woodward,
in his book The War Within. Woodward writes
that the key to the Iraq surge, in addition to buying
off the Sunni insurgency, was a top-secret program of
extrajudicial executions run by McChrystal, which was
"possibly the biggest factor in reducing" Baghdad's
violence during that election year. One US adviser
in charge of tracking down and killing
insurgents, according to Woodward,
said the efficiency of the
program gave him
Kilcullen may be
the true progeny of the
"best and brightest" is evident from
his attempt--in 2004 writings--to salvage the
US Phoenix program from its discredited image in
histories of the Vietnam War. Kilcullen has written that
he favors a "global Phoenix program" against
insurgents today. "Contrary to popular
mythology," he believes that the
"maligned" Phoenix program
was "highly effective" in
disrupting the Vietcong
infrastructure.
Under
Phoenix, according
to the 1971 Congressional testimony
of William Colby, the former pacification
director in South Vietnam, more than 20,000
Vietcong suspects--many of them the civilian infrastructure
in Vietcong-controlled areas--were killed from 1968 to 1971.
Run by the CIA through South Vietnamese police units,
the program employed methods of torture
including electric shocks to testicles
and vaginas, and truncheons
to the ears.
Tens
of thousands
of South Vietnamese villagers
were uprooted and resettled in fortified
"strategic hamlets," in accordance with the
counterinsurgency doctrine of protecting the civilian
population. Thirty years later the Iraq surge seems
to have included another version of the Phoenix
program, directed by McChrystal.
Countless Iraqis were
targeted and
may be the part
where an inbred secrecy
ultimately leads to a brilliant but
delusional Apocalypse Now sensibility,
expressed in the Joseph Conrad character Kurtz's
exclamation "Exterminate all the brutes!" The
further tragedy of counterinsurgency is that
it does not stop in the face of failure
but starts all over again
from its own
ashes.
In
the end,
its secrets will
not be kept from its
victims in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, who suspect and know all too
well who is killing them, but from well-meaning
Americans living in our own gated communities
amid democratic structures that seem
unable to save us from a remote
controlled, engineered